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APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the Seventh JuJicial District Court 
of Sanpete County, State of Utah 
Honorable F. W. Keller, Judge 
STATEMENT OF Y:ACTS 
The Appellant appeals from an Order of JuJgment made 
by the District Court of Sanpete County, on the 19th day of 
November. 1948. The Respondent filed his complaint on 
September 12, 19,17. The case was trieJ on the 29th and 70th 
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Plt~inti{f and Re.r prmdeN!, 
vs. 
VERGA PETERSON ANDERSON, 
Defendant cmd Appel!cm! 
CASE NO. 
7291 
4 
days of October and on the 19th day of November, 1948, and 
on the 19th day of November, 1948, the Court made and 
entered its Order of Judgment in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendant for the sums of $4,545.00 and $500.00, 
respectively, together with interest upon said sums from May 
31, 1946, and June 29, 1946, respectively. From this Order 
and Judgment, the defendant appeals to the above entitled 
Court. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS 
Comes now the defendant and appellant and makes 
the following assignment of errors upon which she will rei y 
for the reversal of the Judgment appealed from in this cause: 
1. The Court erred in denying defendant and appellant 
judgment in the trial of said action in the District Court, no 
cause of action, and in entering judgment in favor of plaintiff 
and respondent in said action. 
2. The Court erred in its Entry of Judgment based upon 
the proposed findings of Fact filed in said action, and that 
said Findings of Fact are not supported by the evidence and 
are insufficient upon which to base the Judgment, and that 
said Judgment is void by reason thereof. 
3. The Court erred in denying the defendant's :Motion for 
a New Trial. 
ARGUMENT 
The evidence in this case shows, in effect, the following 
facts: 
That plaintiff was the son, and defendant, the daughter, 
of John S. Peterson, deceased, he having died on February 22, 
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1947. In checking over the property left by the decedent, the 
children discovered that there had been some money drawn 
out of the bank where he kept his account in Gunnison, and 
in discussing the matter, the defendant herein advised them 
that he had drawn the money out of the bank and paid off a 
mortgage on the hotel which belonged to the defendant. The 
plaintiff and his witnesses claimed that the defendant had 
designated, at one time in the conversation, that the money 
received by her was a loan, and later that she stateJ and main-
tained that it was a gift to her. Over this conversation, the 
matters in question in this law suit arose, and upon this con-
versation alone does plaintiff bring his action and rest his case 
upon said reported bare statement that the money was a loan, 
and gives no credit whatever to the statements of the defendant 
that the money was a gift to her. 
It is evident from the evidence in this case that no evidence 
of indebtedness growing out of a loan was taken by the de-
cedent from the defendant herein at the time the money 
was paid for her, and, therefore, there is no evidentiary 
record in writing concerning the matter, the plaintiff relying 
wholly upon the alleged statement of the defendant tlut the 
money transferred to her from her father in his lifetime was 
a loan. \Ve will briefly, at this point, state a summary of the 
evidence on the question involved in the case. 
The first witness testifying for the plaintiff was Billie 
Peterson Clinger, a daughter of the decedent who, upon the 
'question involved here, testified as follows: That her father, 
in July and in November of 19'16, when she visitec! him at 
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Gunnison, Utah, was living in the hotel with Verga (who is 
the defendant herein) and that she was taking care of him 
at the time of said visits; that in 1944 the decedent had given 
the defendant a deed to the hotel and that all of the children 
of the decedent so understood (Tr. 4); that the balance of 
the children were happy that their father was being cared for 
by the defendant herein; that in checking over the bank ac-
counts and books taken from the decedent's effects, they found 
some check stubs missing in the books (T r. 5). 
That Vance, a brother, had taken over the store belonging 
to the decedent in January, 1946 (Tr. 6). 
That in the conversation, and apparently in the discussion 
with reference to the money, the defendant stated that she knew 
where the money went; !~at -~~r. father loaned it to her to pay 
off the mortgage; that a short time thereafter she stated to them 
that it was a gift to her and not a loan (Tr. 7). The witness 
again stated that the defendant had referred to the money 
received from the decedent as a loan (Tr. 11). When the 
witness was asked if the defendant stated that the $600.00 
item was loaned to her by the decedent, her reply was "that 
was my understanding of it" (Tr. 15). She does not say the 
defendant so stated. 
Jessie Sprott,.called as a witness for the plaintiff, testified 
as follows: That in April and November of 1946, she visited 
her father; that at that time, he was living at the hotel and 
was being taken care of by the defendant (Tr. 16). That at 
the discussion about the money involved some of them were 
present and some of them had gone to their homes (Tr. 17). 
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That when they found a check missing in the check book, the 
defendant was not present (Tr. 17). The witness does not 
know whether the defendant was present at any of the con-
versations because her father had died and she was upset (Tr. 
19). That the defendant claimed the money was a gift to her 
(Tr. 22). The witness does not know whether any other 
sums were given, save and except the $4,500.00 or whether 
any other item was discussed at all that night (Tr. 23). That 
the defendant had stated that she took the check stubs and 
cancelled checks from the check books so that she would have 
evidence that her mortgage was paid. When asked upon cross-
examination to repeat the statement made by the defendant 
concerning the $4,500.00 check, or to state what was said about 
the matter by anyone, the witness stated that she could not 
remember, and that she could not state what was said (Tr. 24). 
That the statement made by the defendant that the money 
was a gift, was made at the horae in the presence of the family 
(Tr. 25). 
Veyda Peterson Pardoe, a witness for the plaintiff, testi-
fied that the dece~!ent, wl1c~ she saw him in November, 1946, 
was living at the hotel with the defendant (Tr. 2G). Tlut 
Verga, the defendant, took care of him at said place; that 
Verga was giving him good care, and was doing her best to 
care for him; that she was good about seeing that he had good 
meals, clean bedding, and that he was personally clean; that it 
was hard for him to get in and out of the tub to Ltkc a bath, 
and that the defendant had a shower put in for him (Tr. 27). 
That the defendant stated that her father had made a loan 
to her to pay off the mortgage; that the money was given to 
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her to pay off the mortgage, and that it was loaned to her; 
that she stated that the money was a gift to her, but that was 
after she said it was a loan (Tr. 31). 
Mac Peterson, the plaintiff, called as a witness on his own 
behalf, testified as follows: That he saw the decedent in 
January, 1946, the last time, and he was living at the hotel 
with the defendant (Tr. 41). That the defendant was taking 
care of him while he was living at the hotel (Tr. 42). That the 
defendant made a statement that her dad had loaned her that 
money to pay off the mortgage of the Gunnison Hotel; that 
the money was paid in the latter part of January, 1946, about 
a year before the decedent's death (Tr. 63). The witness 
was asked if he had found any entries in the ledger or in the 
account books pertaining to such an item, and he replied that 
he did not; that the witness found out that the decedent had 
made a check for $500.00 on May 27, 1946 (Tr. 64). That 
the witness saw a cashier's check for the amount of $500.00 
(Tr. 65). The witness testified that the defendant told them 
that the money was a gift (Tr. 70). The witness testified that 
since the time he signed the complaint that he had found out 
from the books that there were a number of items of money 
that came in to the decedent as collection on accounts that 
were never banked in the bank (Tr. 73). 
C. E. Anderson, a witness called for the defendant, was 
sworn and testified that he is the cashier of the Gunnison Valley 
Bank; that he was familiar with a release of mortgage dated 
January 29, 1946; that he signed the release as a Notary Public, 
notarizing the signature of I. Overfelt (T r. 79). That he 
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knows the signature of John S. Peterson and the signature of 
I. Overfelt; that the Release of Mortgage was executed on the 
date it bears; that the check paying off the mortgage was made 
in the handwriting of Mr. Overfelt and signed by John S. 
Peterson, which papers were introduced in evidence (Tr. 80). 
Charles Rasmussen, a witness for and on behalf of the 
defendant, was sworn and testified that he was a Director 
of the Gunnison Valley Bank, and was now President of the 
Bank, and had been for four or five years; that he had been 
a Director of the bank for many years and had had business 
transactions with John S. Peterson (Tr. 82). That he had 
seen him practically every day and had rented property from him 
for 21 years from 1917 to 1938 (Tr. 83). That he was always 
alert in his mind and knew what he was doing in a business 
way (Tr. 84). 
Deliliah Jensen, a witness called for the defendant, testified 
as follows: That she saw JohnS. Peterson, the decedent, at the 
hotel practically every day (Tr. 87). That she lnd heard 
conversations between the decedent and the defendant and had 
heard statements that the decedent had made to the dfendant 
(Tr. 88). That upon one occasion, when she and the defendant 
and John S. Peterson were present, she was wallpapering the 
bedroom when he came home. That was in the latter part of 
February, 1946; that when he came in, she commenced kidding 
with him because she had known him for many years; that 
she said to him "you are fixing it up Mr. Peterson," and he 
replied, "Yes we are fixing it up; I gave Verga the money to 
pay off the mortgage so that she could have it nice. r d rather 
not, I don't want a mortgage over my head and I don't want 
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a mortgage on the house that I am living in." (Tr. 87B) He 
further said "it is my money and I can do with it the way I want 
to. If I want to give it away, I can, this has been my business 
and there is nothing that I would rather see fixed up nice than 
this hotel." (Tr. 88 and 89B) That this conversation took 
place in the hotel in the decedent's room; that one day when 
a Mrs. Worthen was present with her and the defendant and 
the decedent, that the defendant was telling the other women, 
Mrs. Worthen, that her dad gave her money to pay off the mort-
gage and that the decedent sat right there and he said yes that he 
did; that the decedent was sure thrilled with having a home like 
he had it, and that he told her so on his birthday on June 8, 1946 
(Tr. 89). That at the time Verga was there and had made a nice 
big cake; that he had given some of it to his dog, and he stated 
that he was glad that the dog could have some and he thought 
more of him than his family. That was on June 8, 1946 (Tr. 
90). That there were many similar conversations along the 
same line (Tr. 90). 
Le Rita Worthen, called as a witness for the defendant, 
testified as follows: That on January 30, 1946, she was in 
the Gunnison Hotel when Mrs. Jensen was present, and that 
Verga was there and Vrga stated "don't you think I have a 
pretty good dad?" to which the witness replied "Yes," and 
Verga said as follows: "he has given me money to pay the 
mortgage off so that I am happier than I have been for a long 
long time." The witness said "I wish you were my dad," and he 
replied "well, this is the nicest home I have had for many 
years, and I feel like I should do something for Verga, for I 
have tried to help the boys (Tr. 4). 
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13ob Anderson, a witness for the defendant, testified as 
follows: That he was a student at the University of Utah, 
and that he was home in 1946, and at the dinner table, his 
father had said to the decedent that his Mother had told 
them about paying off the mortgage, and he said to the 
decedent "Verga tells me that you paid off our mortgage," 
and he asked the decedent why he paid it off (T. p. 96). That 
the deceased answered by saying that the reason he paid it 
off was because he did not want a mortgage on the roof over 
his head, and that he might as well help Verga as give it all 
to the boys, and then his Mother, Verga, asked the decedent 
if she should tell the rest of the family about it and he answered 
"No," that it was none of their business and he did not owe 
any of them a cent, and that she should tell them when the 
right time came; that that was all he had said about the matter 
(T. p. 97). 
Leonard Anderson, called as a witness on behalf of the 
defendant, testified as follows: That he is the husband of 
the defendant, Verga Peterson Anderson; that he was ac-
quainted with the deceased in his lifetime; that at a certain 
time he asked the deceased how he came to pay the mortgage 
on the hotel, and the decedent answered him by saying he 
did not want a mortgage on the roof over his head; that he 
wanted to help Verga out a little bit, and he had the money 
and that he thought he had better do that inasmuch as he did 
not want to give it all to the boys (T. p. 98). 
Verga Peterson Anderson, the defendant, testi!i.cd as 
follows: That at the time the family met together after the 
decedent's burial, they had a conversation relative to the money 
12 
in question in this case (Tr. p. 102). That at said conversation, 
while they were having dinner, there was a quarrel about 
what became of certain monies that had belonged to the 
decedent, and that Merrill had accused Vance of taking the 
money; that they were sore at Vance over the store proposition 
so while this conversation was going on, the defendant decided 
to tell them about the money her Father had given her, and 
she told them the truth about the matter, that her Dad had 
given her the money to pay the mortgage off and that the 
reason she is now in a law suit was because she had told the 
truth, and after considerable bickering, the crowd separated 
and the next morning they got in touch with the defendant 
and requested her to go to the bank and borrow money and 
pay the money back which had been given her which she refused 
to do, stating that her Father had given it to her, and that she 
did not owe anyone of them a dime, and that Vance said to 
all of them that if they would pay off all the money that the 
deceased had given them through the years, it could all be 
put in the bank and split up, and the defendant replied that 
the deceased had given her the money, and that she did not 
owe one of them a dime, at which time Mac suggested that 
they get Lew Larson and repeat both sides of the story to 
him, and whatever h!s decision was would be accepted; that 
on Wednesday afternoon they went to see Mr. Larson and 
told him their side of the story and on the following morning 
Mr. Larson came down and they all held Court over to the 
house (Tr. p. 104). That they held a meeting, all members 
being present, and that each side told their story to Mr. 
Larson, and he stated as follows: "I think this girl has earned 
.. 
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···:: every dini.e she has," and the rest of the family became sore 
·~..::and said that they would fight it out in Court; that they then 
:held no further conversation with the defendant, but ostra-
;:cized her from the family, and shut the door in her face; 
'''· 
that they then went ahead and sold the things out of the 
house and disposed of the property and never consulted 
her further about anything (Tr. p. 105). 
From the foregoing it will readily be seen that there 
is no evidence whatever concerning any loan transaction from 
;· the decedent to the defendant; that is, there is no evidence 
to establish a loan by any act or statement of the decedent 
made in his lifetime or of a~1y other witness concerning 
any transaction between the decedent and the defendant in 
decedent's lifetime; no papers of any sort indicating any 
agreement upon a loan between the said parties, and there is 
evidence in the record to show that the decedent, in his 
lifetime, did not claim the money delivered to the defendant 
as a loan, but his statements, as testified to by the witnesses, 
proves conclusively that the money was a gift and was given 
to the defendant to pay off the mortgage on the property in 
which the decedent lived, and in his own words, for the 
reason that he did not desire to live in property that was 
covered by a mortgage. This leaves us, for consideration, 
as the only evidence in the case, the alleged statement of the 
defendant that her Father had loaned her the money, said 
statment allegedly having been made at the time of the 
meeting of the family after the burial of the decedent, and 
it will be noted that all of the testimony given concerning this 
transaction is to the effect that immediately after the alleged 
[ { 
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statement of lo~b, ana at the same time, and in the same 
<;on~ersation, th~ defendant asserted that the money 111 
question was given to her as a gift from her Father. 
And this is not an unusual circumstance when considered 
m the light of the fact that the defendant had taken the 
decedent and made a home for him and kept him comfortable, 
taking care of his every want and need in his old age anJ 
declining years. 
When all of the circumstances as they existed, as revealed 
by the evidence, are taken into consideration, it would be a 
natural human thing for the decedent to do to have con-
sideration for the people who were furnishing him housing 
and taking care of his every want and need, to want to 
reimburse them in some way, and when the life of the decedent 
is reviewed it can cause no emotional upset of one's mind 
when he requests that the pl2ce in which he lives should not 
be burdened with a mortgage but that it should be clear, 
and, of course, it was his money and he had a right to do 
with it as he saw fit. 
This merely shows unquestionably that the preponderance 
of the evidence in this case is in favor of the defendant and 
against the plaintiff. 
In support of our position we submit the following 
argument and citations. 
It will be noted that the matter at issue concerns only 
the proposition of whether the money paid in the discharge 
of the mortgage upon the property was a loan or a gi:t. 
J 
.... , 
.. 
.,. ' \.... 
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The appeal, as taken, rests upon the propos1t10ns that 
the judgment and findings are not supported by and are con-
trary to the evidence, and that the plaintiff failed to support 
his allegation of a loan by a preponderance of the evidence, 
and in fact, failed to establish so much as a prima facie case 
against the defendant, when all of the evidence is considered, 
and particularly the evidence adduced by the defendant in 
the trial of said cause. 
In the first place, a judgment must be supported by the 
findings of fact as required by the Utah Code, 104-26-3. 
"Under this section written findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, separately stated, must be made and ftled before any 
judgment can be entered. They are the foundations of the 
judgment and are as necessary to precede any judgment as 
a verdict in case of trial by jury. There is no presumption 
in the absence of fmdings." Reich v. Rebellion Silver Mining 
Company, 3 Utah 254, 2 P 703. 
There is also the requirement of the law that the findings 
must be properly supported by the evidence in order for the 
judgment to stand. "The requirements of this section ( 104-
26-3) is just as essenti·1l in equity as in a law case. A judgment 
rendered on no findings, or not upon sufficient, or proper 
findings to support it, has no more validity in equity than 
at law." In re Thompson's Estate, 72 Utah 17, 35, 269 P. 103. 
The judgment of the trial court, being a conclusion of 
law based on the findmgs, cannot itself be supported by an 
alleged finding of fact which is identical to the conclusions 
itself, and unsupported by the necessary findings of fact. "The 
' . 
\ 
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,, court's finding must be of fact and not a conclusion of law; 
that is, the court must specifically find the facts with regard 
to the matters and then draw his conclusion from the facts 
found." Brown vs. Johnson, 43 Utah 1, 134 P 590, 46 LRA 
(NS) 1157. 
A failure on the part of the trial court to adhere to this 
rule operates to defeat a party's right to appeal ond suppresses 
those basic rights provided by these rules of procedure in our 
judicial system. "Where a case is tried to the court without 
a jury, the court should find the facts upon every issue, either 
affirmatively or negatively, as the evidence may be, and thus 
give the defeated party an opportunity to assail the findings 
as not being supported by the evidence." Thomas v. Clayton 
Piano Co., 47 Utah 91, 151 P 543. 
The present appeal rests mainly upon the contention that 
the judgment of the trial court should be reversed because, 
"The trial court should not make findings of fact where there 
is no evidence to support them. If it does so, judgment 
thereon will be reversed." Hathaway v. United Tintic Mines 
Co., 42 Utah 520, 132 P 388. 
Likewise, if there is evidence to support them, then said 
finding should be supported by a statement thereof. It being 
contended by the defendant that a finding of a loan is a legal 
conclusion, and not itself a finding of fact. Finclin~s of 
fact involved in the present issue must relate to the elements 
which make up such a conclusion, namely: 
1. Appropriate contractual intent on the part of both 
parties to the transaction. 
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2. The existence of a valid loan agreement. 
3. The delivery of the money with the necessary intent. 
Since a loan seriously cannot be said to exist unless these 
three elements are present, to adjudge that a loan does exist 
in the absence of a specific affirmative finding on each of these 
three elements would be contrary to law and reason, a cir-
cumvention of the requirement of section 104-26-3 of the 
Utah Code and in violation of the precedent set forth above. 
The plaintiff in this case alleges that the transaction in 
question was a loan. The defendant denies this, saying that 
the transaction was a gift. 
It goes without saymg that the plaintiff, the movmg 
party, in alleging the transaction to be a loan, has the burden 
of proving it by a preponderance of the evidence. "The 
burden of proof is upon the party asserting the affirmative 
of an issue, using the latter term in the larger sense and as 
including any negative proposition which such party might 
have to show. If he alleges a fact that is denied, he must 
establish it. He is the actor, and as such remains so throughout 
the case as to the allegations which he makes, or rather must 
make. Having alleged the truth of a matter in issue, he must 
prove it. The party denying his allegations cannot have this 
burden at any time during the trial." 216 P 691, 31 ALR 14!J1. 
The plaintiff must fail to recover if he fails to discharge 
this burden or if the evidence is equally balanced. 30 Utah 
453, 85 P. 1002. 
Thus it is obvious that the plaintiff, alleging a loan, 
must prove it. "When an action is brought to acquue 
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money alleged to have been loaned by plaintiff to defendant 
under an oral contract, and defendant claims the money as 
a gift, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the alleged oral 
agreement to repay." Mace v. Tingey, 106 Utah 42, 149 P2d, 
Payne v. Williams, 62 Colo. 86, 160 P 196. And ordinarily 
there is no presumption against a gift. Mace v. Tingey, supra, 
Jackson v. Lamar 68 Wash. 38'5, 121 P 8'57. 
Again from the case of Mace v. Tingey: "The undisputed 
record reveals that in September, 1937, Elizabeth Emma Dyer, 
herein called deceased, an elderly spinster, entered tbe home 
and employment of defendant as a domestic; that in November, 
1938, due to a combination of defendant's financial condition 
and the impaired state of health of deceased, such employment 
terminated, but deceased continued to live in defendant's 
home without charge until her death in April, 1942, except 
for a short time (six weeks) in 1941 when she was in a hospital. 
Plaintiff contends that the court erred in admitting testimony 
as to these facts and evidence shmving that duririg part of 
that time, deceased was either practically an invalid or unable 
to completely care for herself or to work, on the ground such 
evidence was irrevalent and immaterial. \Vas such objection 
well taken? Plaintiff refers us to no authority where this 
point was involved, but the question is not one of first im-
pression. Where, as here, the question is as to whether the 
transaction was a loan or a gift, and neither party can testify 
thereto, the circumstances under which the transaction took 
place are certainly material in determining the intent of the 
donor and the purpose for which the property \Vas turned 
over. Testimony touching the motives, indecements, or 
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reasons for the donor turning the property to the donee, rather 
than the heirs is pertinent to the issues." Gilham v. French, 
6 Colo. 196 2dP. St. Rep. 196; Nichols applied Evidence, 
Vol. 3, p. 2383; "and is admissible for the purpose of sustaining 
the probability that the gift was in fact made." 38 C.J.S. 867; 
Sando v. Smith, 237 Ill. App. 570, 28 C.J. 674, and note 96. 
"The relation of the parties, the sit'Uatior1 then existing, and 
the circumstances under which the gift was made, including 
the donor's previous life, habits and relations to others, as 
well as the condition of the donor at the time of the gift 
may be considered by the court;" Russell v. Langford, 135 Cal. 
356, 67 P. 331; "so too evidence of friendly or affectionate 
relations between the parties," Young v. Anthony, 104 NYS 
87, 119 App .Div. 612; Smith v. Maine, 25 Barb. 33; Rhodes 
v. Childs, 64 Pa. 18; "that the parties had resided together," 
Currie v. Langston, 92 Mont. 570, 16 P. (2d) 708; "and that 
the donee had rendered service to the donor," Young v. Anthony 
supra; 38 CJS 868, 28 CJ 674; "is admissible on the question 
of motive and intent." 
"Generally the donee has the burden of proving a gift." 
Blackburn v. Jones, 59 Utah 558, 205 P. 582; Ward v. Ward, 
94 Ore. 405, 185 P. 906. "But when an action is brought to 
recover money alleged to have been loaned by plaintiff to 
defendant under an oral contract, and defendant claims the 
money was a gift, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the 
alleged oral agreement to repay." Payne v. Williams, 62 Colo. 
86, 160 P. 196. There is no evidence in the case at bar of any 
agreement to repay. "Ordinarily there is no presumption against 
a gift." Jackson v. Lamar, 67 Wash. 385, 121 P. 857. "There 
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was here no witness who testified directly as to the transaction. 
Plaintiff produced witnesses, beneliciaries under the will, or 
relatives, who testified that defendant told them the money 
was a loan and -that she should have signed a note. The so-
called "dead man statute" (Subdivision 3 of Sec. 104-49-2 
UCA 1943) was invoked by plaintiff to prevent defendant 
t~stifying as to what actually occurred when the money 
changed hands. Defendant, as a witness however, denied 
making the statem'ents attributed to her by pl;intifis witnesses. 
She offered a witness who corroborated her denial that she 
had stated the money was a loan; another witness testitied 
that deceased had told him she had given defendant the money." 
Not only is the burden of proof on the plaintiff, but he 
also must be first to proceed with his proof of the matter 
alleged. This is true because the relationship of the parties 
involved in this controversy, together with the surrounding 
circumstances as found in the record, not only fail to raise 
a presumption in favor of the plaintiff by placing the burden 
of proceeding with the evidence on the defendant, but to 
the contrary. The evidence contained in the record points 
to the probability of a gift (Mace v. Tingey, supra.) The 
record shows that defendant was the daughter of deceased, 
that she cared for the deceased and helped to make a com-
fortable home for him, that deceased expressed his intention 
that she should have the hotel, that the members of the family 
all understood and were in agreement with an understand:ng 
to that effect, and that a check signed by deceased discharged 
a mortgage note of the daughter held by a bank on the 
property given defendant by deceased. The record contains 
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no evidence indicating discord or lack of love and affection_ 
between the daughter and deceased. 
contains no evidence indicating discord or lack of love and 
affection between the daughter and deceased. 
These circumstances, as shown by the record, not only 
do not help the plaintiff, but do raise a presumption in favor of 
the defendant, namely, that the payment by deceased was a 
gift to defendant. "A payment by a parent of a substantial 
amount to discharge a debt for a child will be deemed prima 
facie to be intended as an advancement or a gift." In re Wiese's 
Estate, 270 N.W. 382; Morrison et al. v. Morrison et al., 96 
S.\'V. 100; West et al. v. Becket al., 64 N.W. 599; In re Picken-
brack's Estate, 70 N.W. 1084, 26 A.L.R. 1146. And even 
where the father, after payment of the mortgage, ta!ces an 
assignment in blank of tbe mortgage and note (the record 
in the instant case shows no disposition of the cancelled mort-
gage and note), such a payment is deemed an advancement 
to the child." Johnston v. Eaton, 51 Kan. 708, 33 P. 597, "and 
the clearest evidence is required to rebut this presumption." 
Lewis v. Bowman, 113 Mont. 68, 121 P. 2d 162; Nailor v. 
Nailor, 5 Mackay 93, 16 D.C. 93, appeal dismissed, 1888, 
127 U.S. 787, 32 L.Ed. 331. Furthermore, "it is presumed 
that advances made between parents and children are gifts, :1nd 
such presumption prevails until the contrary is clearly estab-
lished." In re Randall's Estate, 101 Colo. 249, 72 P. 2d 471; 
J\furphy v. Murphy, 95 Iowa 271, 63 N.\'V. 697; Higham v. 
Vanosdal, 125 Ind. 74, 25 N.E. 140; First Nat. Bank v. Keller, 
122 N.J.Eg. 481, 194 A. 554. 
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Consequently, with the burden of proof and the burden 
of proceeding with the evidence being on the plaintiff, what 
must he prove? !he payment of the money is admitted. The 
plaintiff, then, must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that deceased intended to enter into a loan agreement with 
the defendant, the existence of such agreement, and the pay-
ment of the money by deceased with said contractual intent. 
Thus, in broad terms, the plaintiffs case depends on his proof 
of deceased's intent. The intent of deceased, accordingly, is 
the vital issue of fact upon which the findings and judgment 
must depend. 
And where, as here, the question is as to whether the trans-
action was a loan or a gift, and neither party can testify thereto, 
the circumstances under which the transaction took place are 
material in determining the intent of the donor.. Mace v. 
Tingey, supra. Reference to such circumstances has been made 
in the foregoing. The record contains evidence by way of the 
testimony of deceased's children that there was a family under-
standing to the effect that defendant was to receive the hotel 
in exchange for her service in caring and providing a home 
for the deceased until his death. The members of the family 
were in harmony with this understanding. The record further 
shows that defendant did care and provide a home for deceased 
until his death; also that imediately after completion of the 
transaction in question the deceased declared what he had done 
and for what purpose. There was no reference or indication 
whatsoever in those statements that the transaction was a loan 
or intended by deceased to be such. No such inference logically 
can be drawn from those statements nor from the transaction 
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itself. No reference was nude to an agreement with dc[enchni, 
no refe·ence was made to repayment by defendant, and no 
reference was made to the disposition of the cancelled note 
and mortgage. The logical and only inference which can bC' 
drawn from the transaction, the surrounding circumstances 
and the statements of the deceased is that dece:J.sed intended 
the payment to be a gift. ' · 't ' ' ' 
The evidence in the record contains nothing which points 
to a loan or which tends to prove facts from which a loan might 
be inferred. Plaintiff has proved the irrelevant fact that almost 
one year after the transaction occurred, defend:mt stated to 
members of deceased's family that deceased had loaned her the 
money. Because of the remoteness in time, such a statement 
cannot be considered as part of the res gestate, thus of value 
in proving the substance of the statement. Furthermore, can 
such a bare and remote statement seriously be considered in an 
attempt to determine the intent of deceased at the time of the 
transaction. Such vidence is clearly incompetent for such a 
purpose. 
It is necessary also to consider the circumstances under 
\\ hich the alleged admission was made. The record shows that 
the members of deceased's family, in the course of compJing 
the assets of the estate, discovered cert:1in unexphined financi:tl 
matters. This, as the record clearly shows, c:1used the temper:; 
and nerves of the members of the family to be strained and 
gave rise to an exchange of words and accusations. It was 
in this atmosphere that defendant made her statement. It is 
clear that under such circumstances any words spoken by those 
involved were necessarily hasty and without deliberation. It 
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was an obvious attempt on the part of defendant to smooth the 
troubled family waters, with little or no regard on her part of 
the consequences of such a statement. Furthermore, the record 
shows that within the space of very few minutes, defendant 
retracted her former statement, and declared that the transaction 
in fact was a gift from deceased. Under the circumstances, 
little probative value can be attached to defendant's admission. 
"Weight to be given admissions, whether oral or written, de-
pends in great part on circumstances under which admission 
was made." Christensen et al. v. Johnson, 90 Utah 27), _ 61 
P. 2d 597. "If an admission, however, is to carry weight, it first 
must be shown to have been made with deliberation." Mehr v. 
Child et al., 61 P. 2d 624. 
Other than this alleged admission by defendant, the recotd 
is bare of any evidence whatsoever which might remotely refer 
to a contractual intent on the part of deceased. Thus, we have 
a case of plaintiff's position resting entirely upon the alleged 
admission and in the face of all overwhelming circumstances 
and testimony to the contrary. "Evidence of verbal declarations 
of adverse party, uncorroborated by other facts or circumstances, 
are not sufficient to sustain jury verdict or court finding upon 
a vital issue." Comm. Importing Co. v. Wear eta!., 200 Wash. 
156, 41 P. 2d 777. 
No direct evidence was introduced at the trial concerning 
the nature of the transaction. Resort was necessary, therefore, 
to the surounding facts and circumstances. Mace v. Tin~~cy, 
supra. The circumstances alone give rise to a presumption of 
a gift, as stated above. There is ample testimony and facts in 
the record to support this presumption. On the other side, the 
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only evidence to support the notion of a loan is the uncorrobo-
rated statement by defendant which is remote in point of time 
and incompetent by way of probative value on the issue of 
decedent's intent. 
It is clear that the plaintiff has failed to prove his allega-
tion of a loan by a preponderance of the evidence. Not only 
this, but plaintiff has failed completely to overcome the pre-
sumption of a gift, establish his prima facie case and place 
the burden of proceeding with the evidence on the shoulders 
of defendant. 
The trial court itself states that the proof of the circum-/ 
stances under which defendant received the money was some-[ 
what vague. In the face of all these factors, can the judgment \ 
be allowed to stand? "Findings and judgments cannot rest 
on conjecture and speculation," 195 P. 2d 574, "and must be 
predicated upon definite and tangible supporting facts." 47 
P. 2d. 53. The plaintiff must fail "where plaintiff's undisputed 
evidence from which essential fact is sought to be inferred 
points with equal force to two things, one of which renders 
the defendant liable and the other not." 89 P. 2d 490. 
As to the duty of the Supreme Court in this regard, the 
judgment of the trial court cannot stand. "When testimony pre-
ponderates on one side or the other in such way as to convince 
the Supreme Court that the trial court erred, the trial court's 
judgment will be reversed." Wilson v. Cunningham, 24 Utah 
167, 67 P. 118. See also Jensen v. Howell, 75 Utah 64, 74; 282 
P. 1034. 
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"The findings of the trial court also must be supported 
by competent evidence if they are to stand." Harper v. Tri-State 
Motors, Inc., 90 Utah 212, 222, 58 P. 2d 18, rehearing denied 
90 Utah 226, 63 P. 2d 1056; Vadner v. Rozzelle, 88 Utah 162, 
164, 45 P. 2d 561, rehearing denied 88 Utah 172, 54 P. 2d 1214; 
Greco v. Gentile, 88 Utah 255, 53 P. 2d 1155. 
It is clear, therefore, that the Supreme Court has the 
power to vacate the findings of the trial court where the finJings 
are manifestly against the clear weight of the evidence as to 
indicate that it was not fairly or impartially considered by the 
trial court, or that undue weight was given to portions of the 
evidence, or that the trial court misconceived or misapplied the 
evidence. In re Yowell's Estate, 75 Utah 312, 329, 285 P. 285. 
We submit, therefore, that on the basis of the record, the 
finding and judgment of the trial court must be reverscJ. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. LEROY SHIELDS 
Attorney for Defendtmt ttnd 
_/lfiPellcmt. 
